

August 1, 1971

at reasonable rates— we are paying the price.

We have concentrated our resources in a non-production Defense Budget—and we are paying the price.

We have adopted a conservative Economic Policy, based almost entirely on high interest rates—and we are paying the price.

We haven't closed glaring tax loopholes, which could raise \$20 to \$25 billions and provide some tax relief to low and middle income people, and we are paying the price.

And we will continue to pay the price for our failures, until we take a long hard look at our resources and decide how they will be allocated.

This requires the development of some consensus on where we are going as a nation and how and when we want to get there.

We need a system for developing goals and priorities for our nation. They need not be chiseled in marble for the adoration of the ages. In fact, if they are, they are doomed to irrelevance. They must be constantly evolving as needs and attitudes change.

But, it is the priority-setting process, a process that provides the basis for public and private resource allocation decisions—that is sorely lacking today. We have made some progress in this direction with passage of the Congressional Budget Reform Bill this year, but this is not enough.

We must create the instruments of government we sorely need to articulate national goals and priorities. We need a Balanced National Growth and Development Policy and Program, as I have proposed in Congress.

We must provide all levels of government with the capacity to plan for meeting these objectives and for anticipating basic changes that will affect them.

And, we must tightly tie together this process, from the local to the national level, in a system of supportive inter-governmental relations—with modern County governments—effectively planning its actions and administering its vital programs.

I urge you to join with me in working to establish this new agenda in policy making—an agenda of vital importance to our country, to creating a strong and stable economy, and to carrying through the promise of a better life for all the American people.

JUDICIAL RESTRAINT ON SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, for the first time in over a century, impeachment articles have been voted by the House Judiciary Committee against a President of the United States. Because of the gravity of this development, preliminary plans have begun in the Senate, so that we are prepared in the event the full House of Representatives sends impeachment articles to the Senate for a trial.

Yesterday, I announced a policy of judicial restraint that I will be following in carrying out my own responsibilities under the Constitution in reviewing this grave question. I ask unanimous consent that my statement on my judicial restraint policy be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT OF U.S. SENATOR RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER

Throughout my Senate term, I have always been free to speak out openly on the issues. I have publicly criticized policies and actions with which I have disagreed, including Watergate.

Now, however, the formal votes of the House Judiciary Committee in favor of impeachment articles transform consideration of Watergate into a quasi-judicial matter with specific Constitutional procedures. If there is a trial, each Senator must take a special oath to "do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws."

If that happens, I will be one of 100 Senators sitting as a judge in the impeachment trial of the President of the United States. Therefore, I have decided to adopt a policy of "judicial restraint" relating to this grave question:

(1) I do not feel it will be appropriate for me to comment on any substantive matter relating to impeachment charges until the verdict has been reached; and

(2) I will not make any judgment on my verdict until the completion of a Senate trial. The actual vote of a United States Senator must be based on the evidence presented at the trial—and mine will be.

I am adopting this policy of "judicial restraint" so that I can properly fulfill my responsibilities as a United States Senator to be a fair and impartial judge in these awesome proceedings.

CIA TESTIMONY ON SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, earlier this month, the Subcommittee on Military Construction, which I have the honor to chair, held hearings on the question of the Navy's request for funds to expand U.S. facilities at Diego Garcia and the effect such a program might have on the future status of the Indian Ocean.

Testimony on this subject was taken in open session from Rear Admiral Grojean, Director, Politico Military Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Senator CLAIBORNE FELL, and Rear Adm. Gene R. LaRocque, U.S. Navy retired, Director of the Center for Defense Information.

In addition, the subcommittee met in executive session to hear testimony from Mr. William Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, on Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.

In that one of the reasons given by Navy for expansion of our facilities at Diego Garcia is to respond to Soviet activities in that part of the world, we believed it important to obtain an assessment of those activities from that agency of the Government assigned the prime responsibility of gathering intelligence data on the Soviet Union.

Director Colby's presentation placed the Diego Garcia request in a much broader context than that of a simple military construction project; and because his was the only testimony presented in closed session, we asked that he declassify as much of his presentation as possible.

That testimony has now been sanitized; and because I believe it important that all Senators have an opportunity to read this assessment before a final decision is made on a project which can have far-reaching military, political and economic consequences, I ask unanimous consent that the relatively brief testimony in question be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: MORI/CDP

PROPOSED EXPANSION OF NAVAL FACILITIES ON THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA

U.S. SENATE,
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY
 CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMMITTEE
 ON ARMED SERVICES,
 Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 o'clock p.m., in Room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Stuart Symington (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Dominick and Taft.

Also present: Gordon A. Nease, Professional Staff Member; Joyce T. Campbell, Clerical Assistant; and Kathy Smith, Assistant to Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Colby, we welcome you.

I see you have a statement. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF W. E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN B. CHOMEAU, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC RESEARCH; WILLIAM B. NEWTON, OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE; AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean began in March 1968, when four ships from Vladivostok made a "good will" visit to most of the littoral countries. In the little over six years since those visits, the Russians have maintained a nearly continuous presence in the Indian Ocean area.

The Soviet naval presence has grown slowly but steadily during these years, and has helped Moscow increase its influence in that part of the world.

The forces the Soviets have deployed in the Indian Ocean, however, have been relatively small and inactive.

The vessels have spent 80 percent of their time at anchor or in port visits, mostly in the northwestern portion of the ocean.

Although the number of countries visited annually has decreased since 1969, the general expansion of the naval force and the increased use of ports on a routine basis have resulted in an overall increase in the number of port calls. Put in terms of naval ship days in the Indian Ocean the Soviet presence increased from about 1,000 in 1968 to 5,000 in 1973, excluding harbor clearing operations in Bangladesh.

By mid-1973, the typical Soviet Indian Ocean force included five surface warships—one gun-armed cruiser or missile-equipped ship, two destroyers or destroyer escorts, a minesweeper and an amphibious ship. There was also usually a diesel submarine, and six auxiliary support ships, one of which was a merchant tanker.

Mr. Chairman, today there are six surface combatants, one submarine, nine minesweepers and 11 support ships in the Indian Ocean, not substantially different from that typical showing, except for the increase in minesweepers, as I will explain later.

Recently, a Soviet intelligence collection ship has been deployed to the Indian Ocean for the first time since the India-Pakistan War, and is apparently monitoring developments in the Persian Gulf area.

It will probably also conduct surveillance of any major Western naval movements in the Indian Ocean.

In addition, a group of Soviet minesweepers has recently arrived from the Pacific to conduct mine-clearing operations in the Gulf of Suez—in the areas shown on this map at the bottom. The ones at the top you will note are being cleared by the U.S. and the United Kingdom.

Last weekend the helicopter carrier *Lenin* grad, on a voyage from the Black Sea, rounded the Cape of Good Hope and may join this

August 1, 1974

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 14093

group. This is by far the farthest from home waters that either the Leningrad, or its sister ship the Moskva, has ever ventured.

The Soviet warships and submarines sent to the Indian Ocean normally come from the Pacific Fleet, which is also the primary source for logistic support. Combatants from the western fleets, however, have operated in the Indian Ocean, but only while transferring to the Pacific.

The Indian Ocean has become, in effect, a "southern sea route" for the interfleet transfer of naval units.

About one-fourth of the Soviet warships and submarines that have operated there have been units transferring to the Pacific from the western fleets.

The Pacific Fleet naval forces are now being modernized. As part of this effort, since early 1974 the Soviet force in the Indian Ocean has included more modern anti-carrier and anti-submarine units, transferring from Soviet western fleets. These units have provided the Russians a more impressive naval presence than could have been drawn from their Pacific Fleet a year ago.

In addition to this de facto improvement in the quality of the Indian Ocean force, the length of time on station for the individual warships seems to be increasing. Some of the ships that have just left the area, for instance, were there for a year, as compared to five to six months for previous rotational tours. This added time on station is at least partly owing to improved Soviet support facilities in the area.

Until 1973, the Russians relied almost exclusively on "floating bases"—collections of auxiliary ships usually anchored in international waters—to provide support to their Indian Ocean naval forces.

The most frequently used anchorages were near the Island of Socotra, and in the Chagos Archipelago, about 1,000 nautical miles south of India, where the Soviets have implanted mooring buoys. You will notice that Diego Garcia is in the Chagos Archipelago.

Contrary to numerous reports about Socotra, the barren island has no port facilities or fuel storage and its airstrip is a small World War II gravel runway. The only military installation on the island is a small South Yemenese (PDY) Garrison. A major construction effort would have to precede any significant Soviet use of Socotra, other than as an anchorage.

In early 1973, the Soviets acquired use of some facilities at the small Port of Berbera, in Somalia. These have now been expanded, and the Soviets are now using the harbor for routine ship maintenance and crew rest.

There are no repair facilities ashore, but tenders now provide the same services in port as they previously did at anchor.

The Soviets have set up naval communications facility near Berbera, and also appear to be building an airfield although they have made little progress [deleted].

The Soviets have use of a POL storage area there, and have constructed a barracks area for their technicians.

Soviet naval ships also have some access to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr, in the Persian Gulf, where Soviet technicians have been assisting in minor port development.

Repair facilities at the former British naval base at Aden have not been used by Soviet warships, although support ships and, occasionally, small warships stop there for refueling and replenishment. Soviet transports periodically land at an ex-RAF airbase—now Aden's International Airport.

Soviet naval auxiliaries regularly call at Singapore as they enter and exit the Indian Ocean. In addition to receiving bunkers, since May 1972, the Soviet support ships have been serviced in the commercial drydock facilities there.

Moscow's prospects for naval facilities in other littoral countries are not very bright.

The Soviets helped build India's naval base at Vizakhapatnam, and have equipped the Indian Navy with minor warships and diesel submarines.

Nevertheless, New Delhi has not granted the Soviets free access to Indian ports, nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future. [Deleted.]

The USSR is trying in some other countries, too, although prospects are equally dim beyond receiving bunkers. Moscow has apparently made overtures to Sri Lanka for access to the Port of Colombo, and has sent in research ships, support ships, and an occasional warship—probably trying to accustom the Ceylonese to a Soviet naval presence.

Similar calls have been made to Port Louis, in Mauritius.

The Soviets may also hope to use the facilities in Chittagong, now that they have finished the harbor clearing operation there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Chittagong? Mr. COLBY. Chittagong is in Bangladesh.

You will recall that the Soviets were asked to help in some salvage and minesweeping efforts there. They finished the salvage very rapidly, but the minesweeping operation was very complicated and difficult. They just finished that a few weeks ago. They have withdrawn from there now.

We have no evidence that the Soviets have made overtures for naval access to littoral countries other than Somalia, Iraq, Aden, India, Singapore, Mauritius, and possibly Sri Lanka.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Sri Lanka again?

Mr. COLBY. To people of our age, it was Ceylon.

Senator SYMINGTON. We had an open hearing this morning and a closed hearing this afternoon, but so far it does not seem to me that there is anything that you have said here that should be classified up to IV in your statement. All that information, as I see it, is something that everybody would know that wanted to know it.

Mr. COLBY. There may be a few phrases in there, Mr. Chairman, that would reveal how we learned certain items. But in essence, I agree with you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you please declassify as much as possible of your statement.

Mr. COLBY. I would be delighted to go through this and pull out those few things that have to remain classified and declassify the remainder, Mr. Chairman.

So far, Mr. Chairman, I have been talking about the more or less continuous Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Another aspect of the problem has been the Soviet surge deployments to the area—and these have been highly responsive to U.S. naval activities.

Moscow apparently prefers to keep a minimal force in the ocean that can be quickly strengthened. This provides a "signalling" capability during crisis periods, while avoiding the political and economic costs of maintaining a larger continuous presence.

There have been two occasions when the Soviets have clearly made use of this "signalling" device.

Following the Indo-Pakistani War of November 1971, and almost three weeks after the deployment of the USS Enterprise, they brought their force level up to six surface combatants, six submarines and nine auxiliaries. This represents a doubling of surface combatants, and a significant increase in submarines, from one to six.

In the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973, the Soviets responded to the unanticipated deployment of a U.S. carrier task group to the Indian Ocean by sending additional units into the area—increasing their submarine force from one to four.

[Deleted.]

Senator DOMINICK. Mr. Chairman, would Mr. Colby yield at that point?

When you are talking about the Soviets, are you talking about missile firing submarines or attack submarines?

Mr. COLBY. We are talking about attack submarines.

Senator DOMINICK. Thank you.

Mr. COLBY. The timing of Soviet ship movements into the area, both during the India-Pakistan War and following the Arab-Israeli conflict, is instructive. The Russian units left port only after U.S. or U.K. carrier task groups had departed for, or arrived in, the Indian Ocean. All indications were that Moscow was chiefly responding to deployments by the U.S. and other western countries, specifically Britain, rather than initiating a unilateral buildup.

There remains one important consideration concerning Soviet naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean—the forthcoming opening of the Suez Canal. We believe this will increase the overall flexibility of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, but not in itself cause a significant increase in the Soviet presence.

Use of the canal would give the USSR easier and more timely naval access, particularly in times of crisis, to the western Indian Ocean—that is, the important Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea area.

It also would facilitate the logistic support of ships in the Indian Ocean and reduce Soviet dependence on littoral countries.

A reopened canal would expedite interfleet transfers and deliveries of military aid.

A few warships from the Mediterranean squadron probably would be sent to the Indian Ocean once the canal opens.

But because of the higher priority of Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean, and the maintenance of a strategic reserve in the Black Sea, the Soviet Pacific Fleet would still be the chief source for surface combatants—and all of the submarines—for the Indian Ocean. Support ships could be drawn from the Black Sea and the Pacific on a nearly equal basis.

The Soviet Union is likely to increase its continuous deployments there whether or not the Suez Canal is reopened.

Moreover, the USSR probably recognizes that the canal is subject to closure in a crisis. The Soviets would not wish to be caught with a substantial portion of available units on the wrong end of a blocked canal, and in considering this contingency they almost certainly would give priority to their Mediterranean squadron.

If there is no substantial increase in U.S. naval forces in the area, we believe the Soviet increase will be gradual, say, one to two surface combatants per year.

Mr. COLBY. [Deleted.]

Should the U.S. make a substantial increase in its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, a Soviet buildup faster and larger than I have just described would be likely. If the canal were open and available to Russian ships, the task of responding would be easier.

In any event, the Soviets would probably not be able to sustain an Indian Ocean force significantly larger than that presently deployed there without reordering their priorities and shifting naval forces from other areas.

Let me now put the Soviet naval activity I have been discussing into the context of overall Soviet objectives in the Indian Ocean area.

Viewed from a global perspective, the Indian Ocean area—as distinct from the Middle East—has a lower priority than the U.S., China, or Europe in the USSR's diplomatic, economic, and military initiatives. Moscow's probable long-range strategic objectives in this area are to win influence at the expense of the west, and to limit the future role of China.

S 1001

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

August 1, 1974

Toward these goals, the Soviets use their naval presence as one element in a combined approach that utilizes political, economic, subversive, and military aid activity.

We believe that the roles of military, and particularly naval forces, have been secondary to diplomatic efforts and aid programs in promoting Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean area.

The principal objective of the naval force is to maintain an adequate military strength to counter—or at least provide a political counterweight to—moves made by western naval forces there, particularly those of the U.S.

Soviet leaders have shown that they will maintain a naval presence in the ocean at least equal to, if not greater than, that of the U.S. Navy.

Soviet writings have reflected concern over the possibility of the U.S. sending nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to the Indian Ocean, but so far the activities of Soviet naval units there have not indicated an anti-Polaris mission.

The Soviets recognize the importance to the west of Persian Gulf oil, and the sea lanes between the Gulf and Europe or Japan. Moscow perceives a causal relationship between the oil question and recent increases in the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Nevertheless, the normal composition of the Soviet force there—particularly the lack of a significant submarine capability—suggests that interdiction of western commerce, particularly oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, has not been a major objective.

At present, about 50 percent of the industrialized countries' oil imports come from the Persian Gulf. This share may decline somewhat in coming years, as alternative sources are developed.

Judging from the size and composition of the Soviet Indian Ocean force, direct military intervention does not appear to figure prominently in Soviet plans.

As for future Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, we believe that growth will be steady over the long term, if there is no permanent increase in U.S. naval forces in the area.

Moscow would probably consider such a measured approach as consistent with a generally growing—and accepted—Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean countries.

Soviet capabilities to project and support larger naval forces in the Indian Ocean are constrained by a variety of factors.

First, is the distance and steaming time from the various Soviet fleets. Those in the western USSR now have to go around Africa, and are twice as far from the Arabian Sea as is the Pacific Fleet. If the Suez Canal were open, the steaming time for the fleets in the western USSR would be significantly reduced, as shown on this map. You can see that the red line south of India, Mr. Chairman, shows the point from which you have approximately an equal steaming time from either the Black Sea or the Pacific Ocean fleets.

Other restraints include the requirement to maintain a strategic reserve in home fleet areas, a large deployed force in the Mediterranean, plus the economic and political costs of operating a sizable naval force in the Indian Ocean.

Moreover, the Soviets are not likely to acquire substantially better naval support facilities for their ships in the Indian Ocean area, at least in the near future. There seems to be little prospect for routine access to large shore facilities—such as those in Singapore, India, Sri Lanka, or Aden—for major repair and overhaul of warships.

The limited facilities that the Soviets use now, such as those in Berbera or Umm Qasr, would require considerable development—and probably changes in the host countries' policies—to provide major services.

On the other hand, the Soviets probably

hope to increase their capabilities for air reconnaissance in the Indian Ocean. Their prospects are best in Somalia, where Russian technicians are helping to construct airfields at Berbera and near Mogadiscio.

Somalia is unlikely to give Moscow permanent basing rights, but would probably allow occasional flights.

TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft staging from Somalia could conduct surveillance from the Cape of Good Hope to the Malacca Strait.

Visits by TU-95's most likely would be on a periodic basis, as in Cuba and Guinea, but might increase in frequency during times of crisis, major western deployments or exercises, or Soviet naval space support activity.

Anti-submarine warfare aircraft, such as the IL-38 May, operating from Somalia could provide surface reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare coverage of the Arabian Sea. These aircraft, as well as TU-16 medium bombers, were based in Egypt until July 1972, and closely monitored U.S. and NATO ships and exercises in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared statement. I would be very happy to answer any additional questions you might like to ask.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Colby. The first request would be that you declassify as much of this as possible.

Mr. COLBY. I will, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. It would be your decision.

Mr. COLBY. The other matters I will do it as best as I can.

Senator SYMINGTON. The more information we can get out in order to help us make the right decision the better.

Mr. COLBY. I understand, Mr. Chairman. In our country our decision-making has to be public as opposed to some countries where it is to be secret, and consequently, we have to make as much of our input public as possible.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you consider the Indian Ocean area to be of strategic importance to either the Soviets or the U.S.?

Mr. COLBY. I would rather answer from the Soviet side, Mr. Chairman. I think the Soviets are interested in the Indian Ocean as an area of expanding their influence, primarily through their political relationships with some of the countries in the area, with the Indians, especially, and some of the other countries in that general area. I think they would obviously be concerned if there were some major threat to Soviet security posed from the Indian Ocean. I think there is a certain interest in posing a possible counter-threat to American or western pressure on the Soviet Union by posing a threat to the oil sources of Western Europe. But it is certainly not in priority anything like their relationships with the U.S., Western Europe or China.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Navy spokesmen have indicated that the Soviets have use of facilities in several locations in the littoral area. I would like to take them one by one and have your comments. I have already heard them in another committee, but I would like to hear them now.

The Island of Socotra.

Mr. COLBY. The Island of Socotra, Mr. Chairman, is a bare island. There is almost nothing there except for a small garrison from South Yemen. The Soviets have used Socotra as they have used many other areas around the world as an anchoring place for their ships. The Soviets spend a considerable portion of their time at anchor. They do their provisioning frequently at anchor. They have anchored there off Socotra in protected waters in order to conduct this kind of re-provisioning and just plain sitting.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about an air strip?

Mr. COLBY. The only air strip on Socotra is on old World War II air strip which is really not feasible for modern operations.

Senator SYMINGTON. We were told of anchorages and permanent mooring in the Chagos Archipelago.

Mr. COLBY. There are anchorages in that Archipelago. Again, some of this water between the different islands is international water, and Soviet ships are inclined to anchor there. They have set up some mooring buoys there in international waters so that they can just come on and hook onto them.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is very close to Diego Garcia.

Mr. COLBY. It is not far from there.

Senator SYMINGTON. On Berbera, Somalia, communications station, barracks, repair ships and other facilities, including air strips. What are the facts on that?

Mr. COLBY. Let me give you an overall picture of the port at Berbera, Mr. Chairman. It is a small installation which will handle two or three ships. And there is an air strip under construction outside of Berbera.

They have been building an air strip there for about a year, but have not gotten very far.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mogadiscio.

Mr. COLBY. Mogadiscio is the Capital of Somalia, Mr. Chairman. It is a big town there. They have an embassy, and they have people there, advisors.

The port is a fairly big port.

But the area within the breakwater is somewhat shallow water, and you would have to anchor a little offshore and bring lighters in if you use the port at all.

There is an airfield about 30 or 40 miles northwest of Mogadiscio which they have been gradually building up a little bit. But there is not much progress on that either.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Iraqi Port of Umm Qasr.

Mr. COLBY. Umm Qasr, you will notice there up at the head of the Persian Gulf.

The sea is down here. You come up a river, kind of a delta area. This particular island is claimed by the Kuwaitis as well as the Iraqis. The facility here, the so-called port, is about four, five or six buildings here, a place where you can anchor. It is a little complicated to get through the delta down to the Gulf. The Iraqis appear to be a little bit restrictive as to the degree to which they will allow the Soviets free use of this particular port. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. The former British base at Aden and the former Royal Air Force Base.

Mr. COLBY. The former British base at Aden is a good base. It is a good harbor. There are facilities in it. There is an airfield in that town. That is the Capital of South Yemen. And there is an airfield that is an effective airfield and could be used.

The Soviets have not used it very much. They have not done much more than port visits there. But the Government of South Yemen of course, is a Communist government. The Soviets have been assisting them. So they have a pretty active presence there. But they have not actually used the port facility to that degree.

Senator SYMINGTON. What kind of a runway do they have?

Mr. CHOMEAU. It is short. It is not large enough to handle the extremely large aircraft. I have forgotten the length.

Mr. COLBY. It is a short runway, not big enough to handle the TU-16's and larger aircraft.

Senator DOMINICK. It is big enough, Mr. Chairman, to handle the B-24, because I have landed one there.

Mr. COLBY. You know, then.

Senator DOMINICK. It is a horrible place. Senator SYMINGTON. It is probably pretty hot, is not?

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator SYMINGTON. Bunkering rights in Mauritius and Singapore.

Mr. COLBY. Singapore, of course, is a very well equipped port. And the Soviets have

August 1974

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 14095

bunkered there. Singapore sells to whoever happens to go by. They have also used Singapore for some repair, because there are some good shipyards in Singapore, and some of their auxiliary ships, for instance, have been repaired in Singapore.

Port Mauritius—Port Louis on the Island of Mauritius is a very good port. It is not all that highly developed. It is an independent country now, Mauritius. They have sold bunkering to the Soviets.

There are lots of other areas. You can stop by and buy fuel oil if you want to.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have they a representative in the UN?

Mr. COLBY. I would assume so. I am pretty sure they are UN members. Whether they actually keep a mission there or not, I am not sure. But I know we have an ambassador there. As a matter of fact, Phil Manhardt is just going there as Ambassador. As you will recall, he was a Foreign Service Officer, and was a prisoner of the North Vietnamese for five years.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Dominick.

Senator DOMINICK. I think I have only got one question, and that is, what is Mr. Colby's assessment—if we should pass the Diego Garcia enlargement, would we by so doing increase the force of the Russian fleet?

Mr. COLBY. I think our assessment is that the Soviets would match any increase in our presence in that area.

Senator DOMINICK. That is all I have.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Taft.

Senator TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COLBY, would you consider that enlarging the port and the airfield as planned would be such an increase or not?

Mr. COLBY. I am not all that familiar with the details of the plan, Senator Taft. I do think that the public impression of what we do would probably be almost as important as what we actually do. In other words, the Soviets would believe that if we were to establish a permanent establishment capable of supporting a regular force in that area, that they would react in some fashion in order to establish a countervailing force. That is more or less at any degree at which we do it.

Senator TAFT. If we have a big debate and authorize it, is that going to have—

Mr. COLBY. It will certainly attract their attention.

Senator TAFT. If we go ahead and authorize it, and public opinion seems to justify authorizing it, would that have an effect on being able to negotiate limitation on forces in the area?

Mr. COLBY. I think that our assessment, Senator, is that you will see a gradual increase in Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area, that if there is some particular American increase, that the Soviets will increase that gradually to match any substantial additional American involvement. So that it would really depend upon the size of the investment and the forces that we arrange to be there. If we put in a permanent establishment of some size, why they would correspondingly increase to some substantial degree. If we had only sort of tentative connections there and some improvements, they might just continue their gradual increase.

Senator TAFT. You have not mentioned the British or French forces, I do not think, that are in the area. Both of them have permanent naval forces.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, the French have a naval base up at the north end of Malagasy as well as a base at Djibouti. They keep a permanent force of five to six ships. And the British, their only permanent establishment is in Singapore, where they keep a very small fleet. [Deleted.]

Senator TAFT. That is all I have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator. Have the number of ports visited by the Soviets in the littoral area increased in the last few years?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The number of port calls in 1973 has gone up particularly because the calls in Somalia have expanded quite a lot. You will notice that they are rather targeted, there are only certain ones.

Senator SYMINGTON. The number of countries visited have dropped?

Mr. COLBY. Yes. It has been more of a focus where they have visited.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I understand it you expect the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean to continue to grow regardless of what we do but that it will grow faster if we start developing Diego Garcia is that a fair interpretation?

Mr. COLBY. I think that is true yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, our estimate of the gradual growth is a reflection of our estimate of the general Soviet intention to assert itself as a major power, as one of the two superpowers, and to assert itself in a world role, and that consequently, there will be a tendency to gradually expand its presence throughout the world.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who reacted first in the Indian Ocean at the time of the Indian-Pakistan War?

Mr. COLBY. In the Indian-Pakistan War, Mr. Chairman, the first thing that happened was that the British sent a carrier task group to help with the possible evacuation of their citizens. The Soviets sent a force very shortly thereafter. And the American force was sent two or three weeks later, or something like that.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about in the recent Middle East War?

Mr. COLBY. In the Middle East War the movement of American carrier task group was followed by a Soviet increase in presence, particularly in submarines.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who has access to the most ports in the littoral area, the U.S. or the Soviets?

Would that be up for grabs?

Mr. COLBY. Even would not be far off, I would say.

Mr. CHOMEAU. I do not know what the U.S. really has.

Mr. COLBY. The U.S., I think, would have access to Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

Senator SYMINGTON. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator SYMINGTON. There was some question as to whether nuclear submarines could go through the Suez Canal when it is opened. What is the opinion of the CIA on that?

Mr. COLBY. Physically, they could go through it, there is no question about it, after it is opened, physically you can send them through. Whether the Soviets would send them through is something else.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there enough depth?

Mr. COLBY. You mean without being seen? I mean on the surface, obviously, just going through, I do not think there would be much problem.

Senator SYMINGTON. There would not be?

Mr. CHOMEAU. They have enough depth, but it is risky. You have to be certain that you are not going to run into some place where it is silted. But there is enough depth if it is cleared, yes.

Mr. COLBY. It depends upon the permission of the Egyptians, of course.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do either of you gentlemen have any further questions?

Senator DOMINICK. No, Mr. Chairman.

Senator TAFT. No questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, July 12, 1974.)

IN SUPPORT OF INDEPENDENCE
FOR THE PORTUGUESE AFRICAN
TERRITORIES

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the Government of Portugal has in the last few days taken significant first steps toward independence for the Portuguese African territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.

On July 27, President Spínola announced:

The moment has come for the President of the republic to reiterate solemnly the right of all people from the overseas Portuguese territories to self-determination, including the immediate recognition of their right to independence. . . .

This is a historic moment for which the country, the African territories and the world were waiting: peace in Portuguese Africa finally attained in justice and freedom.

A law has been promulgated in Portugal opening the way for this promised independence to become a reality.

As a friend and ally of Portugal, we share her great expectations of peace and freedom for both the people of Portugal and the people of the African territories. As a country which is committed to human rights and to the replacement of colonial rule with genuine self-determination, we rejoice that Africans will finally take their rightful place among the independent states of Africa. As a friend of the African nations that have worked and sacrificed to bring about the independence of these territories, we share their commitment to a transfer of power that is peaceful, their hope that independence will come without further suffering or bloodshed.

I hope it will be made clear that the United States fully supports Portugal's intention to grant independence to Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. We must encourage every effort made by the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement to work out with African leaders in the overseas territories a viable plan for independence. Having joined the rest of the world in condemnation of Portugal's past colonial policies, we must now make it clear that Portugal is not alone in her efforts to bring peace, justice, and freedom to the African territories.

But genuine self-determination will take time to build in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, just as it will take time to build in Portugal itself. It is important, therefore, that this country not only give diplomatic support to Portugal's policy of independence, but that we also give substantive support to making this independence viable.

I believe that one of the greatest contributions we can make to this effort is to provide educational assistance for the future leaders of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. The new African states will need African administrators, economists, agricultural specialists, engineers, scientists, teachers, doctors, and businessmen if they are to have genuine self-government. But education for Africans in the Portuguese territories has been far from adequate to meet these needs. One supporter of the Armed Forces movement has been quoted as saying: